

Moscow Calling San Diego: An Experiment in Intercultural Communication

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Abstract

On July 20, 1983, the Communication Department at the University of California, San Diego carried out a simultaneous videocast with participants at the 13th International Film Festival in Moscow, USSR. Three Soviet film directors and three American filmmakers showed segments of their films written for children. Filmmakers and children discussed the film segments, sang songs together, and viewed brief films showing the context in which the participants were located.

This experiment demonstrated that for approximately \$21,000.00 (including a \$5500.00 extra charge for ordering the satellite link late), a mutually satisfying new form of international communication is possible. It was further demonstrated that a small university department with only a small supplement to its existing facilities can mount such events.

An especially important result of this experiment was the demonstration of the usefulness of our communications strategy. We set out to help people to establish a common referent so that their understandings and misunderstandings would be constrained by the standing rule that the talk must be relevant to the topic at hand. By seeing the films for themselves and hearing Soviet reactions, the audience was allowed to make their own judgments about the people they were interacting with. Despite several small difficulties resulting from the shortage of time, the audience came away feeling that a new kind of communication had occurred. As one child said, "They seem just like us, but different somehow."

INTRODUCTION

This is a report about an experiment in communication—a simultaneous video link between studios in Moscow, USSR and San Diego, USA devoted to the topic of films for children. The first hint we had of such a project arose in a discussion in Moscow on June 15 of this year. Preparations began on June 26th on the American side. On July 20 the broadcast took place. Three American film makers and three Soviet film makers showed segments of their work to each other and several hundred Soviet and American children who made comments, asked questions, and sang together.

After presenting the background to the project, we will give a reasonably full account of the project from its inception to the videocast and summarize the post-videocast state of the production. We conclude with a discussion of the main lessons to be learned and our preliminary thoughts on the future of this form of communication. We have not had time to check spellings of names and affiliations in the cases of all the people mentioned in this report. Corrections and additions are hereby solicited.

Previous Broadcasts

In September of 1982 and again in May of 1983 the Unison Corporation, a philanthropic organization in California arranged simultaneous videocasts with studios in Moscow. Using large screens in the two sites, participants in the first videocast exchanged popular music. During the second videocast, there was an extended discussion between cultural figures and common citizens on the two sides.

The moderator of these events was Vladimir V. Pozner, a Soviet journalist who had made extensive use of satellite mediated video exchange while appearing as a Soviet spokesman on such programs as ABC's "Nightline."

Moscow Stage

June 12 1983

Michael and Sheila Cole arrived in Moscow as part of a delegation of developmental psychologists. They left Moscow for New York two weeks later, arriving the evening of June 26th. In the interim, M. Cole spent his days attending scientific meetings while S. Cole, a journalist, investigated family life and child rearing in modern Russian families, a topic she had worked on many years earlier as an exchange student. In the evenings they visited with friends from earlier visits to Moscow. One of these friends was Vladimir Pozner whom they had know since they were exchange students in Moscow 20 years previously.

June 14th

The Coles spent the evening with Vladimir Pozner and his family. Late in the evening Pozner was visited by Joseph Goldin, the man who initiated idea for this project. Goldin and Pozner were discussing the extraordinary reaction to a videocast that had occurred not had long before. They had some American press accounts that there might be a rebroadcast in the USSR, where official reaction to the citizen-citizen discussion was very positive (see attached news clippings). As the clippings show, the American press was not altogether sympathetic; the basic idea of television mediated get togethers was treated positively, but the medium of rock music and the general carnival atmosphere had less appeal. (Congressman Timothy Wirth, Chairman of the House Telecommunications Committee, saw the Soviet rebroadcast. In a telephone conversation he reported that he found aspects of the program interesting but it would not have mass American appeal.)

June 17th

The Coles met Goldin again. He arrived at Pozner's apartment late in the evening. With him was Charles (Raz) Ingrassi, associated with Werner Erhart Associates. Ingrassi was in Moscow with a group of San Francisco businessmen as part of a tour. He was very interested in satellite mediated broadcasts and appeared also to be interested in Soviet human potential experiments which might have some relationship to the activities of his company.

Late in the evening the talk turned to the topic of communication. Pozner and M. Cole had talked often of the forces in contemporary society which made communication such a pervasive concern in

politics and the organization of people's everyday lives; both were interested in the way in which popular culture serves as a medium for innovations. The precedent of the previous videocasts and the formation of a Department of Communication at UCSD introduced a new ingredient into this discussion. Goldin, who was characterized by the Soviet cultural affairs officer in Washington as an "impresario," and who could never be accused of thinking small, introduced the idea of doing a simulcast with UCSD. In the manner of late evening conversations in Moscow when everyone has sampled the vodka and it is easier to imagine the world as a tractable place, Goldin spun out a fantasy of cooperation on a simulcast.

June 18th

Unbeknownst to the Coles, Goldin drafted a proposal for a simulcast in connection with the Children's Film Festival that was to be part of the 13th annual International Film Festival, to run from the 7th-20th of July. This document, an original and translation of which are enclosed, does an imaginative job of reading actuality into a web of possibilities that existed almost entirely in Goldin's mind — at the outset. The Coles did not see Goldin again for a week — until the 24th. During that time they pursued the various tasks that had brought them to Moscow, while Goldin (evidently) worked out whatever preplanning he needed to propose a concrete simulcast.

June 24th

Goldin was behaving as if the major obstacles to a broadcast had been solved. He had, in his own head, worked out at least one plausible scenario, that he believed would be supported bureaucratically in Moscow and which would easily obtain financial backing in the U.S. because of his perception of the success of the simulcasts. This scenario was constructed around the Children's Film Festival Film which was part of the 13th International Film Festival to be held in Moscow, and an idea from a previously conceived simulcast that focused on exchanges between children in several countries (Goldin is still working on the larger proposal, the space bridge project currently being developed by Slobodo in Washington D.C.; see appendix for description of these plans).

Several features of the idea appealed to the Coles in spite of the obvious difficulties of arranging such an event in the three weeks between their return to the U.S. and the proposed date of the telecast (which we initially assumed would occur around the 13th). First, the nature of the Soviet response to the simulcast with the U.S. festival in San Bernadino had indeed been unusual. Serious cultural and scientific figures in the USSR who attended (Voznesenki the poet, Velikov, an academician) seemed ready to push for more such activities, and they were getting support. The Coles were also impressed that the interest was strong enough to put a virtually unedited tape of the exchange on national TV during prime time on July 4, a day when the American ambassador to the USSR speaks to that nation (relations permitting). Somehow the technological trick was turning out to be a socio political event.

June 25th

Goldin met with M. Cole for an hour to summarize the background of his own efforts and sketch out the steps needed from the American side so that he could proceed with plans in Moscow. Then S. Cole spent the day with Goldin getting as straight as possible what he thought he was doing and what he thought the Coles should do in order to allow the project to go ahead. An essential part of this plan, which made the present project different from its predecessors, was that the Soviets would pay for half of the satellite transmission costs. This detail reduced significantly the costs of production. Another part of the plan was also a big cost saver, but a big risk as well: The scripting of the program would be done by phone and telex.

Goldin provided the Coles with the address of F. Yermash, the director of the Soviet State Film Committee, as well as addresses for people in California and elsewhere who had promoted and executed the previous videocasts or were planning new ones.

Initial American Reactions

June 26th

The Coles attempted to reach Dmitri Devyatkin, a New York video maker, who was the only American associated with Goldin whom they knew (Devyatkin had made a film of learning/teaching

techniques by a Bulgarian named Lazanov; the Coles had met him and discussed this work in the 1970s). Devyatkin was in Moscow, planning to make a film. His answering service referred them to Arlen Sloboda in Washington, D.C.

When Cole reached Sloboda with the news that Goldin was proposing to do another space bridge in connection with the Moscow Film Festival Sloboda quickly made clear that he had other commitments which made it impossible for him to think about such a project at all. Goldin was moving too quickly for him, and one of his major concerns was that the Coles not muddy the waters with possible funding agencies. They agreed to avoid using the term. "space bridge," he wished them good luck, and they said goodbye.

The Coles then spoke with a friend at CBS, Howard Weinberg, who suggested that they attempt to get help from the American Film Institute in obtaining the participation of American film makers.

June 27th – June 30th

M. Cole met with Fritz Mosher of the Carnegie Corporation with whom he had a prior appointment to discuss Cole's research in psychology and communication. He described the proposal for a videocast and some of the background events in the USSR and USA leading up to it. Mosher thought the idea an interesting initiative, but perhaps excessively uncertain. Because of the Carnegie Corporation's commitment to research that may help resolve international conflict, he wanted to be kept abreast of events; he also told Cole that he had set up a meeting with David Hamburg for Thursday, the day the Coles were leaving for California.

At intervals in their other work, the Coles made several phone calls to find out what kind of support might exist for the proposed video simulcast.

On the 27th they reached Children's Television Workshop. Their inquiry about possible CTW involvement in the program drew immediate interest, and after two helpful conversations with staff, contact was made with the office of Robert Hatch, a producer in the international department who seemed to have jurisdiction. When Hatch himself was reached on the 28th, he was very interested in the idea. However, he was not interested enough to consider more than participation with a piece of film or one of CTW's well known figures; he offered no money. Cole learned that *Sesame Street* had not received a warm welcome in Moscow, but he also learned that there was a lot of sympathy for the idea of the program. The problem of money loomed large.

About this time the Coles reached the Unison Foundation, the group that had supported the previous simulcasts. The President of the foundation was unreachable (he is currently working as an engineer at Apple) but by chance they reached Richard Lukens, one of the people who had put together the previous broadcast. Lukens is also associated with the American human potential movement and was one of the people whose phone number they had been given by Goldin.

From Lukens they learned that Unison had fared poorly in the overall effort that produced the May simulcast. Financial support from that quarter appeared doubtful at best. This judgment may have been incorrect but seemed reasonable at the time. Lukens was working in some way with Jim Hickman, another name from Goldin, and another major figure in previous simulcasts as well as other forms of people-people diplomacy. While the nature of their overall effort was unclear, it was apparent that promotion of the previous simulcast for mass broadcast in the U.S.A. was not going well and that Lukens and Hickman were preoccupied getting an abbreviated form of that broadcast into shape to present to PBS. Lukens wished the project luck and the Coles promised to be back in touch.

Why Not UCSD?

The Coles had expected, on the basis of Goldin's statements, that there would be support, both financial and technical, for a new telelink from those who had helped put together previous efforts. That expectation was false; no such help was available. People were overcommitted. However, Goldin was correct about one thing. The idea did get support. Starting with CTW, and continuing through a remarkable series of phone calls and discussions, support for the idea began to take shape closer to home. It became clear that in order to carry out the project, we would have to do it out ourselves.

June 29th

“We” now takes on a definite meaning in the shape of a group of people associated with the UCSD Communication Department and Media Center, the group of people who eventually created the simulcast. M. Cole called the Communication Department to find out if it was technically possible to broadcast from the studios at UCSD. After a few hours, Sherman George, Acting Director of the Center, came back with the answer, “Yes.” We would have to rent some equipment to supplement our own, but it could be done. Late on the evening of the 29th, contact was made with Helene Keyssar, Chair of Communication. Could she get together film makers using a few leads the Coles had come up with and her own contacts? Did she think the project was implementable? She said she would look into it and we would discuss it on the 30th, the day that the Coles were seeing David Hamburg and flying back to California.

June 30th

M. Cole met with Hamburg and Mosher. The conversation ranged over a variety of issues in the social sciences and public policies. Hamburg immediately grasped the possible significance of creating a quality interactive program of the kind we were proposing and urged that we do our best to see it happen. It was too soon to talk of support. There was still nothing to support. But something was taking shape. Keyssar had made some phone calls and was pretty certain that interesting film makers could be enlisted to help.

But we needed an estimate of costs, and we needed to make certain of UCSD support for the effort.

July 1st

This day marked a crucial turning point if the videocast was to go forward. The telegram to Yermesh proposing the project had to be sent or time would run out. M. Cole, Keyssar, Jane Geddes, (chief administrator of the Communication Department) and Sherman George assembled to discuss the feasibility of a videocast. Keyssar and George estimated a budget of between

\$13,000 and \$15,000; to be cautious, they indicated that costs might go as high as \$18,000 including supplies, travel, labor, equipment and satellite charges, but they believed that not counting post-production charges, a budget of \$15,000 was reasonable.

Serious consideration was now given to the UCSD facilities. Space was a problem, but not an insurmountable one. The Media Center which housed the Communication Department contained two color studios, but neither would comfortably hold more than 50 people with any room for camera movement. Because the key experience would be “live” we wanted a fairly large audience. The larger audience and nature of the event meant we had to have large screen video projectors which were not owned by the Media Center of Communication but would be borrowed or rented on and off campus. Video cameras and 3/4 inch decks were available as were sound equipment and lighting instruments, but no matter where the program was set, additional equipment would be needed. To insure that we had broadcast quality footage for possible rebroadcast, one-inch recording equipment would be needed as would high quality cameras. We considered a number of campus locations, including outdoor ones, analyzing their technical difficulties and ambiance, and eventually settled on the Mandeville Recital Hall, a 9.11’ by 120’ room used for drama and music performances, seating a total of 200 guests and participants. The space had no video facilities; all equipment and most lights would have to be borrowed from the Media Center or rented and set up for the occasion. A mobile studio-control room would have to be rented and set up outside the building as would the satellite downlink and uplink. (We eventually had to ask a colleague in another department for permission to use his office for the uplink; he readily agreed.) We would also have to brighten the set with paintings by the children and posters. These were ad hoc but workable conditions.

Cole, Keyssar, Geddes and George divided the tasks and got on the phone. On the advice of the American Film Institute, Cole and Keyssar contacted Shanta Herzog of the American Center of Films for Children. Ms. Herzog was immediately enthusiastic about the idea. Herself the coordinator of an International Children’s Film Festival in Los Angeles, Ms. Herzog came up with possible film makers and films, providing us with two of the three film makers we eventually included. She and her husband, Milan, began making phone calls seeking support, but even at the time of the first call, it seemed clear that at least volunteer participants of a high order could be expected. Further crucial support came from the UCSD administration. A call to the Chancellor, Richard Atkinson, found backup support to allow us to start seeking outside funding in earnest. Enough pieces were in hand so

that we felt we could send a telegram to F. Yermash, head of the Soviet film industry, to propose that a simulcast be arranged between UCSD and the Moscow Film Festival any time between July 12th and 15th. Copies of the telegram were sent to Goldin and Pozner.

July 2-4

The San Diego group entered the July 4th weekend expectantly awaiting confirmation from Gosfilm (the Soviet film committee). In the meantime they continued phoning around looking for film makers who could commit themselves to come to the videocast and seeking money to cover the costs.

Following the holiday, there was no telex response from Moscow. At this point, the issue of time and communication began to be felt. Over the weekend, Keyssar had made a number of phone calls and sent out letters to film directors and their agents detailing the project and inviting them to participate; pressed for an exact date by people whose lives were constrained by shooting schedules, she had named July 13th as the most likely date. Shanta Herzog in Los Angeles phoned, also needing an exact date and time for the broadcast. The 13th (or 14th or 15th) was only a week away, and George also needed an exact date to book satellite time. Geddes had begun to work on audience, children participants and public relations; she, too, was paralyzed by the lack of a confirmed date. In addition, there remained serious problems about funding. Cole and Keyssar had planned to spend time on July 5th attempting to secure further funding but both felt hesitant without the confirming telegram from Moscow.

Because of current restrictions imposed by the USSR, phone calls into the Soviet Union must be booked one week in advance. Moreover, such a booking is no guarantee of a successful call. We had booked a call to Pozner as soon as we sent the telegram. But when no answer had arrived by Tuesday, we badly wanted to find out what was going on. The only phone number we had was Pozner's and we did not know how to reach it. At this point, Cole remembered Jim Hickman saying that sometimes he could help with calls. So Hickman was phoned. He did in fact arrange for a call. We reached Pozner who said that everything seemed to be going fine with the arrangements; we were to expect a telex and a phone call the next morning.

With that assurance from a reliable source, Cole and Keyssar renewed their efforts to secure financial support for the broadcast. Cole received commitments of \$5000 each from the Carnegie Foundation and the Foundation For Child Development. A number of other possible supports were pending by the end of the day.

Later that day we got a call from David Midler, a staff person on the House Telecommunications Subcommittee. His message was not clear to us. He asked if there had been trouble with the telecast in a tone that suggested that he had heard that we were having difficulties making arrangements on our side. Since we had had nothing that felt like the kind of trouble he was describing, and since Pozner had affirmed that all was well in Moscow, we answered "No" and wondered why he had called.

July 6th

There were no calls or telegrams from Moscow on Wednesday, July 6th.

July 7th

The next morning, however, we did get a phone call from Moscow, from Joseph Goldin. He asked that instead of the dates we had originally proposed that we substitute the 20th of July as the date for the videocast. He said that so that date, everything would run and he would call the next morning.

Goldin also told us that he had met with Timothy Wirth, who was in Moscow with a Congressional Delegation. According to Goldin, Wirth had offered to help if we ran into any trouble with the broadcasts. Eventually we figured out that the call from the House Subcommittee on Telecommunications had been, indirectly, a call from Wirth, trying to find out more about the May videocast, which he saw on Soviet TV thanks to Goldin.

By this time Sherman George had some pressing technical questions about the satellite links. He needed to know the proposed pathway and particularly the originating point in Moscow. But he did not get very far. We said on the phone that we had to discuss our ideas about the content of the program; Goldin agreed, and said that they would Telex us a lengthy proposal for the script that we should receive the next day. He suggested that we work on the script over the week-end and that we all discuss it on Monday morning, July 11, when he would call again. We agreed. When we came to

technical details, Goldin said that he would have someone appropriate available for the Monday phone call to discuss these details. Then the line went dead.

Immediately after this phone call, we sent another set of telegrams to Yermash, Pozner and Goldin. Each telegram was identical and stated that the 20th was an agreeable new date. In this set of telegrams we also named 1700 hours universal time, the hour somewhat confusingly discussed on the phone.

We wanted confirmation of the exact hour of the broadcast, since we could not book satellite time without an exact hour. It is important to note here that we could not, for example, ask the satellite company what hours were available, nor could we give them a preferential list of times. We knew by now that the only way we could get satellite time was to attempt to book a particular hour on a particular day and that the booking must be accompanied by a check for \$5000. How much of that we would get back was unclear; we thought that if we pulled out anytime before 25 hours before the videocast was to occur, we would get all but a few hundred dollars back. We were certainly worried at this point that if we did not book the satellite time, someone else might. The hours possible, given time difference between Moscow and San

Diego, were very limited, especially given children as participants and directors and crew who were participating free or at very low cost to us. Four in the morning San Diego time (three p.m. Moscow time) just would not do.

That afternoon at 1:30 we finally got an answer from F. Yermash in Moscow:

Thankful for your interesting proposal. Unfortunately, it has been received too late and we have no time to carry out the necessary technical preparation in order to realize your initiative this year. I hope some later circumstances will let us come back to your project.

To say that Yermash's telegram was disconcerting definitely understates the We had spoken with Pozner and Goldin, both of whom told us everything was fine, but our written "confirmation" was negative. We reasoned (correctly, but irrelevantly) that the telegram must have been sent before we spoke to Goldin. The time difference between UCSD and Moscow meant that

Goldin was speaking to us well after working hours on the same day as the telegram was sent. Nonetheless, everyone was made very uneasy by the evidence of discord on the Soviet side; up to this point we had been happy to believe that matters were more or less set in Moscow, with only our side uncertain. Now it appeared that we had overestimated Soviet readiness.

July 8th

No telexed script arrived on Friday. Nor did the scheduled phone call to Pozner go through that night, although we had "reserved" the phone time the week before.

July 9-10

Throughout the weekend, we awaited a call or telegram, but none arrived. We were frozen, caught between extremely difficult pressures of time if the videocast were to occur and conflicting signals from Moscow. Why would Goldin have said on July 7th that everything was fine on their side and they were working on a script that would arrive in our hands immediately if they had already received a definitive no? Inquiries came from people such as Hollywood lawyers trying to help us acquire legal rights to film segments. A network of people around this country were moving ahead, trying to help us secure funds and a program. Was it the moment to say "halt?" We told everyone with whom we spoke that as yet we had no definite yes from Moscow, but after Goldin's and Pozner's calls, we had indicated our strong belief that the videocast would occur.)

One irony that week-end was a call from Raz Ingrassi to Mike Cole at home. Raz had spoken to Sheila Cole during the previous week, but had not reached the others, nor had he spoken about his plans. Raz now reported that while his group had attempted to mount a "space-bridge" for the same period for which the UCSD was planning, they had failed. Raz's people had attempted a program in Hollywood that would have included popular entertainers like John Denver. He wished us well.

July 11th

On Monday morning, the call came in at almost the same hour as it had on Thursday, July 7. Goldin told us that the only problem had been our proposal of the 13th as a date; as soon as we had sent the

telegram proposing the 20th everything was fine. We breathed easier. But this phone call also left us with some nagging questions about the Moscow site of the videocast and the exact time on the 20th; we proposed 9:30p.m. Moscow time, 10:30 a.m. in San Diego. We were promised confirmation on the following day. Goldin then introduced us to a man named Steve Kull, whom he identified as an American working with them on the program. Kull identified himself as an associate of Michael Murphy, head of the Esalen Foundation. Kull also said that he himself was a psychologist. He told us that they were about to go to work on the script and said that they hoped the children would play some kind of game together. Goldin's earlier promise that we would have their draft of a script already in our hands was never mentioned. Goldin then got back on the phone, said that he would have the technical person on the line the next morning. He also asked us if we would send a telegram stating that Steve Kull was our agent in Moscow. (We subsequently learned that Kull played an important role as living proof that some group of Americans from California were serious about this proposal. Kull *is* from California, but not UCSD.)

This call from Moscow remobilized the efforts in San Diego, but also created an uneasy aura in the group. Why was there no script, no positive telegram from Moscow, and no reasonable explanation of these absences? Who was Steve Kull and what would it mean to authorize him as our "agent" in Moscow? What effect would this have on the program content? After some debate, Cole and Keyssar decided to respond positively but with some ambiguity to the request concerning Kull. We sent a telegram saying that "we are happy to work with Steve Kull," a response that we hoped would be read as informal but cooperative. Our act of faith was matched by Kull.

With all this uncertainty, the UCSD group nonetheless proceeded on July 11th to continue seeking the support of participants and funders. William McGill, ex-Chancellor of the University, suggested the Lounsbury Foundation and the Price Family Foundation as possible sources of funds. They were contacted and funding was secured. We could now cover our estimated costs of approximately \$15,000, but sought additional funds so as to spread participation as widely as possible and to depend as little as possible on university money. (No matter how little actual funds were supplied by the university it would clearly be matching outside grants with equipment, staff and faculty time and space).

July 12th

The program from the American side was beginning to take shape. We were prepared to suggest to Goldin and Kull that the game the children played be a computer game developed by the Laboratory of Comparative Human Cognition; we had some uncertainty about exactly how the game would be played interactively, but we had arranged for a colleague on his way to Moscow that week to take the computer program with him. Shanta Herzog of the Center for Children and Film and John Matthews, a director of children's animations, were definitely coming; Matthews film, *Curious George Goes to the Hospital* was on its way for preview and cutting to UCSD, and Herzog was discussing participation with other well-known directors. Herzog and Keyssar had both made contacts with the offices of Steven Spielberg and George Lucas; there were encouraging signs that either or both these directors might participate, and it was felt in particular that showing a segment of Spielberg's *ET* would be excellent since it represented an exceptionally successful and provocative instance of American film for children. Herzog was simultaneously trying to contact Robert Radnitz, whose film *Sounder* could stand as a good example of the kinds of human valuea we wished to discuss. Shelley Duvall was seriously considering participation in the program, using a series of filmed fairy tales that she had just produced.

Goldin and Kull called in the morning exactly as they had said they would. This time, there was a new voice on the phone in addition, that of Edward Baranov, a video engineer who was to work with the video cast from the Moscow side. Edward spoke English and had a conversation with Sherman George, our technical director, concerning details such as scan conversion, uplink and downlink locations, types of cameras to be used, audio transmission, and satellite routes. Edward gave George a telex number he urged that we use for any other crucial communications; we had no office telex but gave the number of our nearest station. Both Edward and Goldin pressed on us the importance of booking the satellite time immediately. The hour, 10 to 11 a.m. San Diego time, 9-10 p.m. Moscow time was agreed to by all. There was still no script described, nor any explanation of the absence of a telexed script, but again we were told one would be on the way immediately.

As the phone call was drawing to its close, we pressed for information about the downlink and final destination in Moscow. While this call was in progress, we discovered from our satellite company that we needed these details in order to make the booking. Goldin seemed to be trying to check this out with Edward, while the Soviet operator was trying to end the call.

In the meantime, Goldin asked that we please contact both the Soviet Consul in San Francisco and the Soviet Ambassador in Washington to make certain they knew of the planned broadcast. We agreed to do so. We thought we heard Edward say that the downlink was Dubna, but then the line went dead.

The Communication Department Staff, the Media Center Staff and Satellite company went ahead rapidly. A list of possible children participants was compiled with the aim being to include children ranging in ages from five to fifteen and representing the wide range of ethnic backgrounds in the San Diego community. Arrangements were also made for inclusion of a larger number—approximately one hundred—children in the audience itself. Because the studio to be used was limited in capacity to 200, we were constrained in the size of the audience. Our hope was that children loosely designated as “participants” would differ only from other children present in having been somewhat prepared for the experience by meeting with Cole and Keyssar and seeing some films together and getting to know one another. The expectation was that children who were not professional performers, as would be the case with all of the children present, would be shy and intimidated by the cameras and the event itself; since we did want the children to participate in the discussion, we felt it wise to prepare a small group to be relaxed enough to talk. Beyond that, we hoped that by placing microphones among the entire audience, we would be able to include comments or questions from other children as well. Both the children who rehearsed (for one afternoon) and those not rehearsed were drawn from a local computer camp, an alternative school in the local community, children of university staff and faculty, and elementary school children from the San Diego Public schools, invited by two women from the community who volunteered to help in the selection and arrange for transportation.

A list was also compiled of approximately fifty adults to be invited guests. This list included faculty and staff who had particular concerns with children, film and communication, representatives of the university administration, and representatives from the local community who were also concerned with the education of children, with film for children and with international communication.

This day also brought an important call from Shelley Duvall's office saying that she would indeed participate in the program and that she was eager to do so. Notably, she was willing from the beginning to participate without any financial recompense except coverage of her travel and accommodations. We were excited by Duvall's participation in part because the fairy tales she was producing were based on a theory that such films could be instructional and entertaining for both children and adults. In addition, a number of other persons accepted invitations to the videocast and expressed their interest in support of any future telelinks.

At 1:30 p.m., another telegram arrived from Moscow. Sent not by Yermash but by another representative of his office and committee, the telegram said, “As we have advised you, unfortunately it is impossible to realize your project this year.” At this time we still were unaware of the cause and nature of the delays in receipt of telegrams (it was not until the next week that this became clear), but given that our explanation of messages crossing paths and being out of kilter in time had been correct before, we tried to track down the exact time of transmission from Moscow. Somewhat to our relief, we discovered that this second telegram had been transmitted on July 8th, well before our more concrete and positive conversations with Goldin, Kull and Edward. We tried, again with uneasiness, to ignore this telegram and presume that everything had changed for the good since its transmission.

Our final contact on Tuesday July 12th was with Congressman Timothy Wirth, whose office had called us the week before. Wirth was just back from Moscow; he had arrived less than twenty-four hours before he called us. He told us that while in Moscow, he had met with Joseph Goldin who had told him of the planned telelink with UCSD. As Chairman of the Congressional Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Wirth said he was interested and supportive of our project and had told Goldin he would try to help us if he could. Neither he nor we could immediately think of any ways he could help, although we did seek his advice and/or assistance in getting phone calls through to Moscow.

He suggested that we get help from the Soviet Embassy, and added that he had as much difficulty making calls to Moscow as we did. We told him that we had been trying to reach the Soviet Embassy, but to no avail. In essence, he said “try again.” The conversation ended cordially, with Wirth requesting that we keep him informed of our progress or any further ways he could be of assistance; we said we would.

July 13th

Once again, a call came from Goldin and Kull. This time, when pressed by Cole and Keyssar, they admitted that they were having some difficulties getting formal permission for the videocast. Pressed for some sense of the nature of the difficulties, Kull said that Yermash was trying to “save face” after having twice said no. Kull also indicated that they were taking the matter to “the highest authorities,” that someone from the Academy of Sciences was taking up the cause in their behalf, and that it just had to be worked through channels. Goldin often lapsing into Russian with Cole, gave assurances that there remained a 99 per cent chance that it would all work out positively. He volunteered, to emphasise his point, that Pozner had said that he was confident the videocast would take place. When we said that we had not yet made the booking, Goldin was very distraught and pleaded that we do so immediately. The phone link was cut short; this was a briefer conversation than those earlier in the week and still there was no concrete discussion of the script for the program.

With no script, no official positive telegram, admissions of difficulty but assurances that everything would work out, we were forced to make a difficult decision about booking the satellite time. Bonneville Satellite company informed us right after this Moscow call that the chances of booking the desired hour and date were growing increasingly slim. We now had the name Dubna as the downlink (this was repeated in the Wednesday call) and it appeared that all that Bonneville needed to go ahead was a downpayment of \$5000. After checking, we discovered that in contrast to previous information, it now seemed that none of this downpayment would be refundable if the broadcast did not occur. Our choice was to continue waiting for an official positive telegram (which meant taking a large chance that there would be no satellite time available once we had the confirmation) or to go ahead on the grounds that Goldin would not still be calling us if the videocast was clearly ruled out from their side.

Unwilling to take this risk of substantial funds on our own authority, we attempted to reach Richard Atkinson, the UCSD Chancellor. Atkinson, who had originally assured us back-up funding from the university, was on his way to a key budget meeting at Berkeley and would not be available until much later

that day at the earliest. We did, however, reach Vice-Chancellor Pat Leden. After hearing the details of the dilemma, Leden said that the enterprise was too important to let drop at this stage. In essence, he gave us permission to write a check on the university's backing for the \$5000 downpayment. Staff rushed the check through and took it by hand across town to Bonneville Satellite. We presumed we now at least would get a reservation. Later that afternoon, John Hathaway from Bonneville called to say that the hour and date we wished were free, information that had been unavailable without our check and exact scheduling request. He was, he said, proceeding with the booking and all looked good.

Arrangements for crew, equipment, audience, rehearsals for children, mailing of film segments from Duvall, publicity, and solicitations for further funding and additional participants continued throughout Wednesday. Extra staff, mostly volunteers and others on minimal honoraria, were called in to assist with set-up of equipment, editing of tapes, shooting of footage on the UCSD context, set dressing, and other pre-production details. Cole and Keysear continued to make contacts and began work on a script. Letters to Pozner and computer game materials were sent to the New York contact who was about to leave for Moscow.

We decided to ask a local folksinger of some renown, Sam Hinton, to to join them. Hinton agreed to participate both in the Tuesday, July 19th rehearsal with the participant children and in the program itself. He did not initially have any firm suggestions for particularly relevant songs, but Sheila Cole said she would work on this with him. We also contacted Leonard Newmark, chair of the Linguistics Department at the University for assistance locating a good simultaneous translator. Newmark agreed to help find the appropriate person. At this time, Sheila Cole also began work on a press release. More contact was made with the UCSD public information office to continue plans for press coverage.

July 14th

The phone call from Moscow on Thursday came in later than had been the case earlier in the week. This time, only Steve Kull was on the line. Goldin was at the airport picking up our mutual New York friend. Most importantly, Kull said that the appropriate officials in Moscow had finally approved the videocast at 7 p.m. that evening, just a few hours before Kull's call. He said that he and others had been working all day, at all levels to gain official permission. It sounded like there had been significant dissension but all resistance had finally been overcome. When asked if a telegram had

been sent out confirming the official approval, Kull said it had been too late in the day to do so, but the telegram and a script would be in our hands by that next morning. We reiterated our need for such a document but told Kull we had committed the money to secure the satellite time. We also stressed that it was urgent that we know the exact origin of the videocast in Moscow; without this information we would have difficulty holding onto our booking. We urged that this data be included in the telegram. Kull said it would be, and the call ended.

Preparations begun on Wednesday continued on Thursday. We began to give shape to our sense of the program, which now included Mike Cole as moderator, fifteen children participants, Shanta Herzog, Shelly Duvall, Sam Hinton, John Matthews. Spielberg and Lucas had both finally declined participation although both expressed enthusiastic support for the program through their offices. Radnitz had not yet confirmed his participation.

July 15th

There was no telegram, telephone call or telexed script from Moscow on Friday. Numerous attempts were made to track down the elusive telegram, to no avail. Late in the day, a tape of *Curious George*, the Matthews animation, and a promotion tape of short pieces from Duvall's fairy tales finally arrived in San Diego. With some of the same unease that had taken over the previous weekend we went into the last week-end before show time with hesitant plans to examine the tapes and decide on segments to be aired. The anxiety in San Diego was at a peak.

July 16th

On Saturday morning, at 7 a.m., the Coles received a call from Pozner. The Coles tape recorded the conversation in which Pozner said that he videocast had indeed been officially sanctioned. Pozner explained that he had not been on the phone for the past several days because he had been in the hospital with a badly burned hand. He provided the crucial information that the origination location in Moscow was to be Gostel Radio. Conversation commenced about the script itself He suggested that we talk each morning of the following week at 8 a.m. to confer about the script and final technical details. Cole asked that he call back again on Sunday morning as well, since Keyssar, who was focusing on the script and participants with Cole, was not present at the time of the Saturday call. Pozner agreed to do so.

The UCSD group reconvened immediately to firm up plans they had left pending because of the previous day's uncertainty. A large network of people was called into action to plan for audience, participants, rehearsals, set-dressing, equipment set-up, tape production, etc. Tapes were screened. It was discovered that the promo tape sent by Duvall did not have sufficient sustained footage, so attempts were made to reach Duvall in order to acquire more material. With only two directors and films confirmed at this time, the UCSD group was now worried that the program content be really good, and they did not yet feel it was of sufficiently high quality.

July 17th

Pozner's call on Sunday was a bad connection. Further discussions were held on the script, with Pozner describing the content of the film segments. (He had named the directors in Saturday's phone call). Pozner as yet had no further detail about the games or dances for the children.

July 18th

On Monday morning, July 18th, Pozner called Cole, Keyssar and George at Cole's office. The group worked through outlines for a minute-by-minute script, structured on the assumption that there would be three Soviet directors and three three-minute segments of Soviet film, two American directors and two five minute segments of American film. We warned Pozner, however, that we were expecting confirmation from Robert Radnitz of his participation, and, in that case, we would move to a format parallel to that on the Soviet side. The bulk of the program would be comprised of a pattern in which a director would introduce his or her film segment, the segment would be shown, and three and a half minutes of discussion would follow. Pozner reiterated their desire to include song and dance, especially in the middle of the program as a way of interrupting any potential monotony in the pattern. Edward and Pozner clarified one element of technical confusion that had been holding up confirmation of the satellite booking: when Bonneville Satellite Company had attempted to book our routes they had discovered that Moscow had booked into someplace called Moscow Studios; we had

the name Gostel Radio. With this apparent contradiction, no final booking had been made. Gostel Radio, it was explained by Edward, was the same as Moscow Studio. The Moscow group was at this point very anxious that we secure our booking. They had checked and found that as per our very early agreement, they now had a confirmed satellite time from 10:30 to 11:30 San Diego time, but there was no record of our side making the booking from Moscow to San Diego. We assured them that now that we had the site of origin in Moscow clear, we would take care of the booking.

On Monday afternoon, full-length tapes of four Duvall fairy tales were hand-carried from Los Angeles to San Diego, viewed and selections made for the videocast. Robert Radnitz agreed to participate and appropriate arrangements were made for his visit. He would send two segments of *Sounder* with Shelly Duvall, who was to arrive in San Diego on Tuesday evening, since he himself would not arrive until or shortly before the broadcast on Wednesday, Cole and Keyssar focused their attention that evening on the script.

July 19th

Pozner was somewhat distressed to learn during our 8 a.m. call that we now had not two but three directors and film segments, but accepted this new arrangement on grounds of something balanced. We worked through the program minute by minute. We agreed to talk again at Keyssar's house at 11 p.m. that evening to deal with remaining uncertainties. Pozner was also worried that there was still no record in Moscow of confirmation of our Satellite booking; we assured him it had been taken care of. George and Edward discussed further technical issues; they confirmed plans for a special telephone line to be set up and open (a four-line wire) from 10 a.m. through the broadcast on July 20th. We would thus be able to have crucial last-minute communication for one half-hour before we all went on the air.

Almost as soon as this conversation ended, the UCSD group was faced with its most severe crisis yet. Bonneville Satellite had called. Because of confusion about the place of origin in Moscow, the satellite time had not, in fact, been booked over the week-end. When clarification finally occurred on Monday, an attempt had been made to solidify the booking, but in the meantime another group had booked and purchased that hour. It was impossible to find out who had booked the time; nor was it possible to discover if any other hours were available on the 20th. to go and through which the Soviets now had one direction booked, San Diego to Moscow.

An hour later, Bonneville Satellite informed us that there remained one and only one possibility for making an alternate connection. We could route the Moscow-San Diego line through a different satellite. This, however, would mean coming out of Lvov in the Soviet Union as opposed to Dubna, and including an extra uplink and downlink in Raisting, Germany. Bonneville thought this could be done, although there was no guarantee that the time was free. There were two major hitches. The change in satellites would be significantly more costly—someplace between \$3500 and \$5500 more than planned. In addition, the San Diego group had no way of knowing if the Lvov link was acceptable and possible for the Moscow group.

It was now imperative that we reach Pozner immediately. After several attempts, we reached Pozner late in the evening Moscow time. He was fairly certain that the Lvov link would work but did not know for sure. At least he could now check and would give us the answer when he called as planned at 11 p.m. our time.

Assuming that the Lvov link would be acceptable in Moscow, there remained the problem of the extra cost for this route. There was little leeway in our budget support. Cole called Carnegie and explained our latest obstacle. With our air time now less than twenty-four hours away, Carnegie agreed to fund the additional \$5000 charge—but only if the telelink did in fact occur. After ascertaining that whether or not we out now we would still lose approximately \$5000, we decided to take the risk on the link.

That afternoon, at 4 p.m. we received confirmation that the link from Moscow through Lvov to San Diego had been booked—although there was still no actual agreement to this from Moscow. This seemed to contradict previous information that no booking could occur without confirmation from both sides, but we took it as a positive sign and proceeded with work on the script.

At 7 p.m. Cole and Keyssar met Duvall at the airport and then conferred at Keyssar's office. Duvall did not like the selection that had been chosen from the fairy tales and an alternate segment was agreed upon and cut. She was also concerned about her specific role in the telelink and this was discussed and clarified.

Cole and Keyssar then went to work revising the script to prepare for Pozner's call. One major hitch in the new satellite link was that we had lost five minutes of time: the routing through Lvov was only available from 10:30 until 11:25. This meant cutting another five minutes from the program, although the audience in Moscow would receive a signal from us for the full hour on their separate line.

Cole, Keyssar and Pozner discussed these problems between 11 and 12 p.m. Pozner's first words were a major relief: the link between Lvov, Raisting and the U.S. was fine. Pozner then read the Moscow proposal for a final script, minute by minute: it did not take account of the loss of five minutes since they did not have this information until this phone call. Keyssar and Cole then read back their proposal which did take account of the 55 minute time period. In addition to the problem of how to cut another five minutes, the major difference between the proposals was in the amount of time allocated to performances by children's groups in Moscow. We ironed out these difficulties as best we could and agreed to discuss final changes at 10am San Diego time, one half-hour before the broadcast, when the open telephone line would go into force.

July 20th: The Big Day

With the audience and participants in place, Cole and Keyssar waited to discuss the final script with Pozner. No call came through. Finally, Keyssar urged George to try to place the call from our side rather than waiting any longer. While George was trying to get the call through, Vladimir Pozner appeared on the monitor and large screen inside the studio. For thirty seconds, only the visual image from Moscow was transmitted. Then the audience in San Diego heard Pozner's voice. In the continuing ironies of this experiment, just before Pozner could see and hear the U.S. side, someone tried to get him to the telephone—the phone call had finally been completed. But now both sides were fully on the air. Pozner brushed the phone aside and began the telecast.

The setting in Mandeville Recital Hall on the one side was bright and fairly informal. Most adults sat in one half of the auditorium on risers in spectator chairs. Approximately 100 children and the participant adults were seated on a large floor area with multi-colored pillows and pieces of carpet and blankets. Two four-by-five large screen video projectors stood side-by-side at an angle facing both the group on the floor and the seated audience. Two cameras were set up to move perpendicularly to each other. Microphones were scattered throughout the room. One screen would constantly carry the video from Moscow, the other would carry what we taped and sent.

Facilities in Moscow were far superior to those in San Diego. The Moscow transmission originated from the central Gostel television studio, an amphitheater equipped with one 10' by 12' video screen and serviced by a sophisticated control room, whereas we used 2 screens throughout, those in Moscow used only the one laser screen which interrupted the video from San Diego only to screen the Soviet films. We counted the use of 10-12 cameras in Moscow (as compared to our 2) which enabled them, most effectively, to shoot a number of shots that contained both their audience and us coming in on their screen. Watching them watching our footage of a surfer in San Diego was a remarkable experience.

From the beginning, the quality of both the visual and audio signals each way was excellent—far better than we expected. The one second delay in transmission took some getting used to, but there were no real technical problems once we were broadcasting.

As we had jointly planned, each audience had present a simultaneous translator expert in Russian-English translation and especially with film. Comments by directors and children were translated as was film dialogue. But potential language barriers were significantly decreased by the fluency of both Pozner and Cole in both English and Russian. When Pozner spoke *to* us, he spoke English; Cole spoke Russian to the Soviet audience and both did a bit of back and forth in both languages when helpful. There was little sense that we missed anything because of language barriers.

The content of the telelink itself is best seen in the tapes made of the event and thus will only be briefly summarized here. Thirty seconds before 10:30am on July 20th, Vladimir Pozner appeared on our large screen and monitors; shortly thereafter, we heard his voice. It was an interminable thirty seconds more until he could see and hear us, and in the meantime we watched and heard his attempts to get a response from us. Once signals were clear - visually and aurally - each way, there was an indescribable moment of awe and exaltation that seemed literally to leap from San Diego to Moscow and back. Applause and cheers followed, and then Pozner grinned and declared that we should get down to the business at hand. As he went from his control room down to the Moscow studio, the "Moscow side" transmitted pre-recorded footage of the Moscow film festival and Moscow itself. We

then showed them our prerecorded footage of what it was like to live in San Diego and work and study at the University of California. Interrupted briefly by an unexpected live dance performance in Moscow, Pozner then began the core of the videocast by introducing his directors; we followed suit. Moscow next showed their first film segments, two comedies. This was followed by a few responses from directors and children on both sides. We then showed our first film segment, a piece from Robert Radnitz's *Sounder*, introduced by Radnitz. More discussion followed. For the next half-hour, we followed the attached script, moving to filmed tales, one Soviet-made, the other American and then to two samples of animation. The major deviations from the script were the elimination of discussion between two fairy-tales and the two animated films and the elimination of a dance-game halfway through the program.

During the program, directors on both sides explained their intentions in making these specific films and generally in making films for children. Children's comments ranged from straight-forward expressions of appreciation to questions and answers about the kinds of characters and stories each preferred. Differences in cultures were revealed in questions from Soviet children about mischief and punishment and school. The Soviet children who spoke tended to be older than the American children who made comments and seemed somewhat more prepared to speak. The videocast ended with a conjoined sense of celebration —balloons were released in Moscow, confetti and streamers in San Diego-and song. Children in Moscow, led by a child with obvious professional training, sang "Doe, a Deer," and the American children joined in. We sang "So Long, It's Been Good to Know You" as our final salute and farewell.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

It is still a little early to be evaluating this experiment in communicating. The entire experience was unusual. We got caught up in a spark or something happening because we were the right people in the right place at the right time. It wasn't chance. It was too constrained to be considered chance. But it was certainly serendipitous; at no point in the process until we could see the smile spread across Vladimir Pozner's face as he heard us for the first time was the outcome in anyway determined. As the time for the videocast ran down into the final seconds and telephone contact with Moscow had not been established, the director of the floor crew looked at Cole and put his hands into his armpits: "We're winging it," he said. "Of course," Cole answered, "It's been like that from the start; we wouldn't be here if we weren't winging it."

1. Public Response

Once the Coles returned to the United States and began to tell their story, the series of events that followed should not be overlooked in terms of their underlying message: *People wanted the project to work*. "People" is a very broad phrase and it has to be used with caution. In this case, it means, "The people at the other end of the telephone line who answered when you call a total stranger asking for help on a very unlikely venture that costs time and/or money." These people, with very few exceptions, said *Yes*. Or, as the first secretary who was accosted by phone at CTW said, "Wow, that sounds interesting!" Their way of saying yes varied. Some people said, "Wait a minute while I try to locate So and So. She will be very interested in your project." Or "yes" might be a confused teletype operator somewhere in Moscow who heard for the first time from an American and who helped us find the right teletype number; or, an international telephone supervisor who listened patiently and let us complete one more emergency call; or the local TV sales agency that gave us a large screen and hauled it around, just for good will. The "Yes" extended to staff of the UCSD Media Center and the Communications Department which freely gave of their time over a period of two weeks, putting aside business that really mattered to them.

It is our strong impression that everyone was caught up in a very simple, but very compelling idea. If there is any way for common people to behave as human beings, and by their actions help to reduce the possibility of holocaust, they will do so. From the response to the experience of being in the auditorium when Pozner appeared on the screen, and especially when we established voice contact, we know there was a spontaneous, very powerful surge of common excitement. We were communicating! We have seen this phenomenon referred to by Murphy and Hickman as the feeling of "distant proximity." It seemed to make quite an impression on everyone that "There they are, people like us."

2. Press Response

The response of the press in attendance was especially interesting. Events of this kind are clearly subject to the charge that they are no more than simple tools of propaganda and that nothing unusual occurs. But the feeling that participants said they felt was visible too in the press reports; they made the pitfalls evident, but evident too was that some real change in overall understanding had been jiggled, if not deeply shaken by this program.

The one exception to this generalization proves the rule in an especially clear way. The story in the Washington Post was taken from one or two alternative A.P. stories written by a reporter who was in the studio. The original two stories and the Post edit are appended. The tone of the Post story is less sympathetic, in several key aspects, than the A.P. story from which it was taken. You will note, if you compare the original with the edited version that it is precisely underlying details about the context that are dropped in the edited version. These are the details which index the excitement which everyone seemed to be feeling. These deletions also accomplishes a subtle transformation about the underlying “feel” of the enterprise. There is a very interesting study to be had by tracing the way that different editors cut the A.P. story. A parallel story may exist for the video segments that went out on DEF. Because we kept track of so many stages of the process and coverage was so wide, we have an unusual record of the way that additional steps distort the messages that get out to people in different sectors of the country.

A clear lesson that the press coverage brings home is the dependence of the media on individual personalities. This was evident in the way that Shelley Duvall attracted a disproportionate amount of attention among the filmmakers and in the tendency of reporters to key on the Pozner-Cole friendship. The result in each case is to draw attention away from the important factors that organized the final event.

We are still evaluating the significance of this “personalizing” aspect of such exchanges as it relates to the problem of reaching audiences outside of the studio who see the event of television. At least one producer has suggested that including focus on individuals within the overall group of communicants would help people to get involved. At the same time, individual focus undermines the larger significance of the people-to-people dimension of the medium. This paradox represents a real challenge to those who would like to see such activity avoid descent into standard programming.

3. Events in Moscow - The Russian Background

Our major sources of information about the course of events on the Soviet side come from conversations that the Coles had with Goldin and Pozner before leaving Moscow, phone conversations with Goldin and Pozner, and conversations with Steven Kull upon his return from Moscow.

In Joseph Goldin’s June 18th proposal for a videocast intended for people in Moscow, we see a clear rationale. See Appendix. Phrased in terms of the success of the previous videocasts and the opportunities afforded by the occurrence of the Children’s Film Festival. Goldin cites his prior contacts as potential sources of financial and programmatic support, and he refers to the possibility of UCSD support. Goldin’s entire phrasing presupposes the feasibility of the enterprise.

We do not know precisely to whom Goldin’s proposal was sent. We suppose that it was sent to Phillip Yermash, head of the Soviet Film Agency, and we suppose further that Goldin had good reason to believe that Yermash would say yes or could be induced to say yes. We know, because Goldin discussed the issue with us, that there is institutional rivalry between film and television as well as personal rivalries between Mr. Yermash and his counterpart in the Radio and Television Agency, Mr. Korolyev. We will be able to fill in this story at a later time, but at the moment the only story we have on why Mr. Yermash turned down the idea initially was that he claimed there would be too little time; when presented with more time, he refused to change his mind because he did not want to lose face. This is the explanation offered by Goldin on the phone and by Kull in our discussion with him.

We know that following his refusal, Mr. Yermash made himself unavailable to Goldin, Pozner and Kull. Blocked in this direct approach, Kull and Pozner went to Evgenii Velikov, a Vice-President of the Soviet Academy of Sciences. They told him that they had the whole thing lined up, but Yermash would not agree. Velikov said that he would take the matter to Mr. Zamanian (sp?), a deputy to Mr. Andropov. Thus, while Goldin and Kull were beginning to talk script and Edward and Sherman

George were starting to talk location, the initiators were still trying to deliver on their half of the project using the prior readiness of our side (little did they know!) as a key argument.

They won. On the afternoon of the 14th, Yermash agreed to sponsor the videocast. Pozner told us later that he personally had seen the text. There is an excellent chance that it was never sent. We speculate that Mr. Yermash was not going to put his name in writing to an event that he did not want to do; he could thus avoid public failure, yet gladly receive the plaudits if the project was successful.

By this time the “creative group” that Goldin spoke of in his initial memo was already assembled. A director named Gusman, along with Mitta, Pozner, Goldin, and Kull (and perhaps others) gathered to start working on the script discussed in another section. Most had been involved with one or more of the prior broadcasts. With the exception of their difficulties with cutting in the first half of the video cast, the group managed to coordinate with us exceedingly well in the next few days using Pozner as a mediator.

Soviet reaction to the program

We have spoken three times with Pozner following the broadcast. In the immediate post-broadcast setting, he was very pleased with the outcome. The audience was genuinely excited and his instinct was that the broadcast was a big success.

Over the next few days his judgment was strongly reinforced. He reported broad coverage that was uniformly positive in the Soviet press. That was no surprise given the warm response to the previous videocast and the very existence of the program. We must wait until we obtain copies of the articles and have a chance to see exactly what Soviet commentators chose to say about the program.

Pozner also told us that a decision had already been made (within 48 hours of the event) to edit a 45 minute tape version of the videocast that would then be aired on “Prime Time” on the Central Soviet Television station. Millions of Soviets would therefore see the videocast. He agreed to send us a copy of their edited tape; we would send him our edited version, in turn, so that we could all compare choices and interpretations.

The most interesting response was Pozner’s news that a new interministerial committee would be formed to coordinate and exploit this new form of communication. Drawing on the Radio and Television group, which is enthusiastically in favor of such activities, the Academy of Sciences, and Goldin’s creative group, this committee will presumably begin to act as agent for further such ventures. We will be extremely curious to see how this new committee operates.

4. Program and Script

From the beginning, the content and format of the program was central to the project. The two previous instances of simultaneous videocasts, both produced by the UNISON Corporation in conjunction with the US, rock and roll festival, had focused on music as the basic medium of exchange; in the second of these events, people in Moscow and people in San Bernadino, California had also exchanged greetings and comments about musical tastes and basic human values. Our intention with the videocast on “Children and Film” was to further explore and specify the nature of the medium itself by pursuing two principles we deemed central to communication: 1) that the most effective way to increase of the differences and similarities was to focus on a mutually accessible object or activity and 2) that the content of any mediated activity should utilize fully the language in which it is communicated. Previous videocasts had identified a rich, new medium. Our goal was to explore possible models that would best fulfill the unique resources of this medium.

The proposed topic, “Children and Film” seemed from the beginning to be a good subject for such a model. It is, of course, relatively easy to be cynical about a proposal to spend a good deal of time and money arranging to have American and Soviet children watch movies together (to put matters uncharitably). “Films and kids” is not the primary topic on everyone’s mind when attention is focused on Soviet-American relations. On the other hand, it did seem like a topic that could permit an exchange of genuine opinions about a subject of common interest. Directly and indirectly, many of the faculty in the UCSD Department of Communication are concerned in their research with children and communication. In teaching, all of us have found that film is a particularly good provocation to critical discussion, especially in contexts where participants know relatively little about each other to begin with.

Working from these basic principles, which our counterparts in Moscow appeared to share, we faced three kinds of challenges. The most elemental problem was to discover just how and where we differed in our notions of ways to implement these principles. Time-both the brief time we had to plan and the one hour limit to the videocast itself-imposed severe constraints that forced us both to confront priorities and to eliminate some desirable possibilities. Creation of enough structure while allowing for sufficient flexibility to deal with the positive and negative unknowns of a live broadcast provided still another challenge.

The essential content and format of the program were established in Moscow by M. Cole and Goldin: we would each show segments of films for children, and participants from each side would discuss these segments. It was implicitly agreed that each side would choose its own film segments; the total amount of time for screenings from each side would be equal, as would the time allocated for discussion of each film. This gave a lot of structure to the program and script but also left much to be decided on each side and negotiated between us.

Among the key issues of discussion was the inclusion or exclusion of activities not directly related to children's films. Early in our conversations, and right up through the videocast itself, some people in Moscow urged inclusion of games, dances and songs. The argument for these activities was that they would make the program more interactive and would break any potential monotony in the film-and-discussion format. We thought such activity might be good if kept to a very limited time period, and after no concrete descriptions of a game came forth from Moscow, we proposed that the children play a computer game. We would send the program with a colleague on his way to Moscow, and we would try to arrange for appropriate equipment.

Kull and Goldin responded noncommittally to our suggestion that the children play a computer game. Kull mentioned, however, that he wanted to take at least five minutes of the broadcast to "play a kind of game" with the children that he had developed. When pressed by us for details, he explained that he had a set of questions he posed to children that were very successful. He gave examples such as "How do you think the world began?" We responded as hesitatingly to this suggestion as he had to ours and we all agreed to think through the various suggestions until the next day when program content would be made firm. In the course of further discussions of the script, the computer game dropped out of conversation as did a number of Soviet suggestions including a mime game.

Questions about the exact nature of the program and participants became an increasingly important focus of discussion as we neared the day and hour of the videocast. A colleague of Jim Hickman's called to raise the question of his participation, possibly with Muhamed Ali; they were in the process of planning a Children's Crusade for Peace, apparently in association with the Esalen Foundation. We rejected this suggestion on grounds that we wished to keep as much focus as possible on children and *films*. We also rejected a possibility of including Samantha Smith, the young American girl who was at that time in the Soviet Union on Premier Andropov's invitation; later, we learned that the Soviet group, too, had considered and rejected her inclusion. We also decided to include a folksinger versed in children's songs in the program. At the least, this would help to warm up the entire audience before the videocast. The group considered inviting Pete Seeger, but instead decided to ask a local folksinger of some renown, Sam Hinton, to join them. Like a number of possibilities considered this week, Seeger was not pursued both because he might then become the focus of the show, despite his own modesty, and because we wished to place some emphasis on the local community of San Diego and the university.

Throughout our decisions about program content, we tried to keep a balance between the power of major "stars" and the quality and strategy of the script as a whole. Shelly Duvall was an excellent participant since she was not only an appealing public figure but the producer of a distinctive new set of filmed fairy tales. Robert Radnitz was attractive not only because he was well-known as a director but because his films explored important human values and family relationships, often among Americans Who were poorly represented in film. John Matthews was an important participant as a young filmmaker who used animation, a distinctive form especially appealing to young children.

Matthews' commitment to exploring new modes of communication with and among children was relevant to our larger concerns. In sum, it would have been a violation of our original aims to simply include famous people because they were famous people; we wanted participants Whose work we valued and whose films might provoke illuminating comments and questions.

Perhaps the most important understanding to emerge from our discussions of program content and the actual content of the videocast was the importance of designing programs that by their very nature

contained “windows of uncertainty.” For videocasts to be authentically illuminating, topics must be ones about which all participants have some knowledge in common, but some questions and some sense of choice. Topics that are too broad and obvious - “Peace” might be an example - elicit only predictable responses from which no one will learn very much. Topics about which we know beforehand that two societies vividly disagree – the roles of political parties, for example – are equally futile to pursue. To the extent that “Children and Film” worked as a topic, it did so because although we could all predict the appeal of certain visual images or sound effects, we could not be certain how children on either side would respond to a monkey who gets into a lot of mischief or to children who play computer tricks on their teacher. By creating contexts that contain some measure of uncertainty, critical analysis and change can occur.

The Script.

While time was the major constraint in all negotiations about the script, our conversations with Goldin and Kull, and later with Pozner also revealed areas where our strategies were similar and areas where they differed. Both those planning the program in Moscow and we in San Diego assumed from the beginning that if a film segment was to be shown, someone intimately involved in its conception should be present and given time to address his or her intentions. There was a striking parallelism in the segments we chose: each side chose to show a fairy tale that had mythic or allegorical meanings and that was brought to life in part through very contemporary uses of special effects; each group chose at least one comic piece; each group chose to show a piece of animation. Although we arranged the order of screenings so that these pieces would complement each other, the selections on each side were independent and the similarities of forms therefore interestingly coincidental. Each side also planned, separately, but with mutual approval, to show some footage that established the contexts in which our groups were located.

There were minor differences about how we would begin and end the videocast. One version of the Moscow script had a five minute introductory sequence from each side, beginning in Moscow. We asked, and got, agreement that there first be a one minute greeting from each side to establish the interactive nature of the videocast. Our initial vision of the end of the program was of a summary discussion of the films and the event, in which children, directors and moderators would participate; we wanted to leave at least five minutes for this, after which we planned to sing a farewell song and thought they might do the same. The Soviet vision of the end was of a party or celebration in which there would be music, dancing on both sides and balloons released. Because the phone call planned for just before the program did not go through in time, the beginning and end of the videocast were the least certain aspects of the script before we went on the air. As a result, we gained some spontaneity and emphasis on interaction at the beginning, but lost any genuine reflective discussion at the end.

Time and entertainment values remained the major difficulties with the script right through the videocast. Without the half-hour of consultation before the broadcast, neither side knew exactly how we were going to cut the five minutes we had lost the day before; we also had no plans for how to handle the five minutes when the audience in Moscow would still receive our signal but we would no longer receive theirs. Once on the air, revisions of the script became even more crucial because the slot allocated for setting the Moscow context and the slot for the first screening from Moscow both went considerably over scheduled time. On the tapes, it is clear that even Pozner was disconcerted by additional, unplanned content on his side; dancing girls appear when he is about to introduce film directors. Thus, twenty minutes into the videocast, significant adaptations had to be made in the script. On the air, we agreed to cut some discussion time and show two sets of films, pairing complementary pieces from each side, back-to-back. We also cut the intermission dance or game that the Moscow group had so much wanted to include. Although better telephone and telex communication and more time to consider what was important to each side would have helped, it is likely that some participants in Moscow would have continued to place higher priority on performances and interactive games than would we; we, in turn, judge that the script should have retained more time for discussion and perhaps even fewer or briefer film segments. We would continue to emphasize the main topic and focus on that topic, but not attempt to deal with as much material; those in Moscow would likely press for more variety in the programming.

Finally, and revealingly, our participants found it difficult to continue communicating once the screen that had transmitted the Moscow signal was dark and quiet. We wonder what it was like in Moscow for those last five minutes when they could see and hear the Americans but could not speak back or be

seen. Problems notwithstanding, the program had a good deal of genuinely compelling moments. Enough to make an interesting program.

5. Communications: Access and Obstacles

One of the ironies of our experiment with the videocast was the discovery that while technical arrangements for a simultaneous videocast were complex from our side, information and money were the only impediments to successful communication in this medium. In contrast, neither money nor information could facilitate telephone or telegram communications, and since quick transmission of information was at times crucial, difficulties making phone and telegram connections almost stopped the project at numerous points.

It is relevant to interject what we came to know only after the videocast and after post-videocast conversations with Pozner and Kull (the latter on his return to the United States in late July). We were correct in our reading that the first negative telegram from Yermash preceded our second set of telegrams changing the proposed date from the 13th to the 20th. The first Soviet telegram was sent out on July 7th, before Goldin even suggested the 20th as a better date. It turned out that when telegrams from the Soviet Union arrived in the United States, in Portland, Oregon, they were immediately called into the phone number at the final destination. But if, as was the case with this and subsequent telegrams from Moscow, no one answered the first call, the message went into a computer from which it would not reemerge for three to four days. Then, when it did, literally, ring a bell for a second try from Portland, one more phone call was made. Again, no answer; again the message was reprocessed through the computer for another three to four days. Only on the third try, now more than a week after receipt in the United States, was the telegram mailed to its destination. This was policy, not a bizarre fluke. It was also the nature of the telegram system that even when we discovered the nature of this process on July 18th, it was impossible to ask for a computer search without the original number, known only by the sender and sending office.

Thus one of the lessons we learned from this whole process was the extreme difficulty of achieving rapid, efficient communication with the Soviet Union. They could make phone calls to us, for lengthy periods, even before the videocast was approved on their side, but at no point could we get a phone call to Moscow without great effort-and most often, not at all. On the other hand, we could get telegrams into Moscow, but the transmission of telegrams within the United States was very slow and undependable-also confusing. In the end, with all irony understood, the only time and way equal and efficient access was achieved was in the video simulcast itself. It was easier to communicate through a telelink than by telephone or telegram.

Our experience with this videocast also clarified what were previously at best vague notions of differences in control and access to modern technology in two different political contexts. In order to book the appropriate satellite time from our side, we needed to acquire assurances of funding from a variety of sources and information, pieces of which were known by different people. We could not book the satellite time without a sizeable downpayment, and it remained unclear throughout the process just how much, if any of this downpayment would be returned if we had to cancel the videocast. An important revelation was that money and information were inseparably linked: we could

not find out what satellite time was available until we put up the downpayment. But nor did money suffice. Even after putting up the appropriate funds, we were dependent on information from Moscow-the exact name of their site of origination for the broadcast before the satellite company would book a time.

Fragmentation of information in the United States is also a barrier to access. No one person, company or institution knew everything that needed to be known to effect the videocast. Until the day before the broadcast, we were still piecing together bits of information, and discovering that some knowledge that may have seemed trivial was key and vice versa. Some strange lapses of knowledge also became apparent. No one, including national commercial television networks or the satellite company with whom we were dealing could tell us if the Soviets would agree to receiving our signal through Intelsat and Dubna while sending their signal through Lvov and Raisting. This may be simply a matter of inexperience, but we in fact received very contradictory messages about the feasibility of this link, a link that ended up being technically easy but significantly more expensive.

In contrast to our difficulties, the main problem facing those attempting to arrange the program in the Soviet Union was that of receiving official permission from a state committee. This appeared to be

complicated, as discussed elsewhere, because of overlapping jurisdiction relevant to a program concerned with film but transmitted through television. In addition to whatever conflicts of authority contributed to the delay in granting permission in Moscow, we have reason to believe that there was an underlying theoretical dispute about the role of television. Goldin was known to have publically taken a position that television was not a distinct medium in itself but was to be conceived of as a servant of other forms, a transmission mechanism to convey but not order or, information.

Once permission was received, however, funds and technical resources and information appeared to be instantly and fully available. It is very important to remark, however, that to this day, our only enduring evidence that permission was officially received is the sound of Kull and Pozner saying so and our tapes of the videocast itself. In perhaps the greatest of the paradoxes that unfolds this event, we still have three telegrams from officials in Moscow saying "no" to our proposal for a simultaneous videocast. To this day, the promised official telegram stating approval from the State Cinema Committee or Gostel Radio has not arrived. It may be fair to conclude that a certain amount of ambiguity is necessary not only within the programming of such events, but in the production process itself. Certainty might be a double portent of failure in communication.

One unique achievement of this videocast merits special mention in the context of access and control of new communication technologies. The July 20th videocast was not only the first telelink to be produced on a focused subject by an American academic department in a very short time. It was also the first such event in which Moscow financed half the cost and co-operated fully (in the end) with technical arrangements. This not only made the endeavor more interactive, it made it feasible for non-profit groups. That the entire videocast cost us approximately \$20,000 and would have cost \$15,000 had we secured the less expensive satellite link in time, remains important and surprising.

6. The Human Potential Movement and These Events

From the first discussion with Joseph Goldin to the actual broadcast itself, the presence of the American human potential movement made itself felt in the formulation of the program and in the process of making the arrangements. We are by no means experts on these movements in the USA or the USSR, but we have learned a great deal about them in course of this project. We summarize here what we have learned and we invite further information from anyone reading this report.

Enclosed is a xerox of the Esalen Catalog copy concerning Esalen-USSR relations which appeared in September, 1981. It gives some background for Esalen's history of interaction with the Soviets and Esalen's assessment of the first videocast. There are many interesting issues raised by this material. To us, Murphy and Hickman's belief that "There is a remarkable symmetry" between Soviet and American interests in the fields of human potential is the single most interesting point to be made. From the experiences that the Coles had in Moscow, the kind of material that the Russians wanted to write into the script, and events surrounding the videocast itself, we believe that the common interests of the American human potential movement and some segment of Soviet opinion powerful enough to ram through this broadcast is an important phenomenon to be taken very seriously by anyone interested in Soviet-American relations. The Unison Corporation's efforts in a rock festival context may be looked upon with some justification as naive and subject to excessive manipulation after fact by the Russians. but they opened a new form of interaction whose limits no one has yet even begun to imagine.

And they are continuing their activity in new ways.

It seems significant to us that the director of the first broadcast, Gusman, did not like the second broadcast. According to Steven Kull's account, he was initially in favor of bringing in Samantha Smith and making a real circus of this program. His dislike of the second videocast centered directly on the fact that adults were talking and talk is boring on TV. He was beaten back partially by Pozner and Kull (acting as "The representative of UCSD"). Yet he was clearly representing one Soviet group's understanding of what such exchanges might be about, a view that is entirely consistent with Murphy and Rickman's account in the Esalen catalogue. In style and substance, there is a great deal in common between Esalen and the Soviet group that is the visible driving force behind this activity.

In so far as we have been able to construct a rationale for how this group might be identified, it centers on the similarity in the life histories of the technological and bureaucratic segments of the two societies. These are relatively well educated people who live in urban settings. Their children go to school for many hours a day to learn different versions of the same history and the same version of the

same technologies. They work similar numbers of hours in similar institutional settings. They spend their leisure time in similar activities.

By the same token, they share similar dissatisfactions. Their institutional work life reaches a point where the excitement of achieving is past and repetition begins. The rapid development of technology and its scientific base leaves many behind once they take on administrative responsibilities where they spend most of their days managing people via technologies that render people summary statistics. There are limits to scientific knowledge and self knowledge that many such individuals seek to surmount.

There is good evidence that such a group exists in the USSR and that it is interested in a lot of the same things that one finds in the Esalen catalogue. It is not at all difficult to imagine the Esalen seminars becoming a smashing success in Dubna, Pushino, or Novosibirsk, where scientists of all kinds gather in "Akademic cities."

Thought should also be given to other areas where the Soviets might be interested in the training programs developed by Esalen, EST and other organized human potential organizations. For example, a chronic complaint at all levels of Soviet life is the failure of people to take individual initiative. The USSR is a country where both the official ideology and everyday cultural understandings operate to give weight to authority. Compliance without initiative is one reasonable strategy for getting by, often called careerism. In its struggle with this problem, Soviet psychologists have often worked on group processes that promote individual change and individual creativity, but with limited success from policy makers point of view (one reason for the renewed criticism of the social sciences that appeared in Pravda during the Central Committee meetings of June,1983).

In these circumstances, policy makers might become interested in psychological techniques borrowed from American human potential psychologists which promised to change individual consciousness in a *politically neutral*, way using group techniques. If true, it would be a manager's dream.

From her interviewing in families, Sheila Cole saw some educational and demographic consequences of the Soviet interest in human potential that may help to explain why it could receive support within the councils of government. Many of the people interested in such ideas are young parents who want to increase the satisfaction of their lives outside of work and find that putting their time into family activities is especially satisfying. By spending a lot of time in constructive activities with their children while "promoting human potential" they are also maximizing their children's life chances in a system like our own, where the more education you get the earlier the more everyone likes it.

A particularly important consequence of the Russian ethos of human potential is that it leads its number to have more children; 2 or 3 instead of the Russian average of 1.4 children. The simultaneous celebration of every infant's potential to become a genius and the promotion of large families flow straight in the direction that Soviet planners are trying to set.

This is by no means a full catalogue of evidence, but perhaps it is enough to make plausible that there exists in the USA and the USSR a subculture held to some extent in common because of common modes of interaction in common, technologically constrained institutional settings organized in the service of economic efficiency.

Joseph Goldin, a Soviet citizen, who is a member of the board of Esalen, proposed this project. Steven Kull, an associate of Michael Murphy, head of Esalen, turned up in Moscow just before this project and helped the Soviet initiators convince the needed people that the program should go on. Jim Hickman helped get a call through to Moscow. Richard Lukens who was associated with Esalen and the previous videocasts appeared in the studio at broadcast time.

Considering the generally miniscule amount of communication that goes on between the USSR and the USA except as it is constructed by Governments or transmitted through the media, American citizens have little opportunity to triangulate on the reality of Russia, and by extension, their own reality. The accomplishments of these groups have been quite unusual; their full meaning remains to be seen.

It is also instructive to think about the alternatives that exist with respect to programming of past and future simulcasts. In the present project we went against the prior pattern of exchanges by focusing our interaction on the content of the cultural artifacts (films) that we could understand in common. We explicitly did not get into a verbal exchange about our common humanity, but rather made that theme the unstated premise, rather than the avert content, of the broadcast. The Soviet director who pushed for a carnival atmosphere was signaling a valid concern; don't drown popular culture in High Culture.

He was also using an intuition based on Russian cultural forms. Time, the failure of that experience to survive translation to the home screen in America makes it clear that some evolution from the initial format is necessary. How can that be done without losing support from the Soviets? How can it be done so that the content is neither exploitive or trivial, and that it really helps citizens of the US (and perhaps the USSR) to understand the motives and reasoning of people living elsewhere in the world.

7. The Role of the University

The group that carried out this project was comprised of professors and staff at a state university that prides itself on its ability to combine research, teaching, and community service. Our ability to implement the project depended crucially on support of many kinds from within the University as well as support from the community at large. In this section we want to focus attention on the issue of university involvement in possible future videocasts or other, similar, experiments in exploiting new technologies to test the possible. We will not try to answer for universities or departments of communication in general; institutions of higher education vary in many ways. We will speak, however, of the philosophy of the Communication Department and the University of California at San Diego of which it is a part.

One often hears it said that the role of the university is to create knowledge and to pass on the best of what is known to the next generation so that they may use the past to plan for the future. There are many ways to create knowledge, but they all have one thing in common; they require deviation from the past. Within the discipline of Communication (among others) the process of creating systematic deviations, both theoretically and in practical demonstrations, is one way to do what is often referred to as critical analysis. One favored mode of operation of critical analysts is to identify a system of social constraints and then seek to perturb the system to reveal properties that are submerged from view when it is running smoothly.

It was in this spirit that we entered, as University researchers, into this project. We set out to criticize currently held conceptions of the constraints that prevent people from communicating with each other by demonstrating an alternative possibility sufficiently compelling to shock people into reflecting on their prior conceptions of how the world works. It was in this spirit that in the face of a flood of unfamiliar information, we kept notes, wrote memos, and taped centrally important conversations.

We believe that this kind of project is central to the mission of UCSD and the Communication Department. The university is supported by the people of California as a place where researchers and students can be allowed to pursue the possibilities facing humankind without having to worry about profit and loss. Facilities such as telephones, telex, duplicating machines, video and sound equipment, space, and human resources of trained faculty and staff are uniquely available in the university context to support this kind of experience. It is difficult to imagine another context, corporate or private, that could provide both these necessary resources and the willingness to use them for non-commercial goals.

In return for this support, the faculty are mandated to document their research and report back any significant findings. Our department is a willing partner in this covenant and perceives the problem of *access* as a central issue in any attempt to realize the university's ideals. Since the founding of our republic, American democracy has been based upon recognition that *all* people need very full knowledge of their position in the world in order to fulfill their essential role as citizens. No responsible commentator is satisfied with Americans' knowledge of the rest of the world; quite the contrary, there has been a flood of concern about our international ignorance. The first area of responsibility that UCSD might, therefore, consider is to continue research on the constraints to the widespread use of this technology between nations and within our own country. Nor need we restrict this investigation to the USSR. Beginning with our own hemisphere, we envision variations on the video simulcast that extend to exchanges with Mexico, the rest of Latin America, and Asia. Existing contacts in China and Japan make these two places good areas for exploration.

It will be a great challenge to give Americans a significant glimpse into the lives and viewpoints of people living in other countries. We will have to avoid total trivialization of the interaction on the one hand, or rigid idealizing on the other. Our group believes that it is possible to apply existing theories of communication that are a part of our basic working repertoire to help construct videocasts that are perceived as genuinely interesting and supportable by all sides. This is what happened in our first videocast, and we do not believe it was an accident. But we could be wrong.

One intriguing outcome of this broadcast is the spotlight it throws on enterprises that are highly valued but seldom acknowledged publically. It is rarely possible to get a strong social spotlight trained on an activity like making films for children. But put OUR activity on behalf of films for children up against THEIR activities of the same kind, and suddenly a lot of people can get interested in the issue itself. They are led to be reflective.

We believe this principle is generalizable, providing one excellent way for admired but often overlooked segments of society to be able to announce their words and exchange experiences. If we are at all correct in our judgment of the possible, the university has a clear role to play. Through carefully constructed interchanges with people in other countries, we can attempt to make our citizens reflective about admirable aspects of their own society, while learning from others how they go about solving problems that are universal.

Such communication would in no way interfere with other forms of interaction using video simulcasts. We fully expect this medium to be used for entertainment and public information purposes in ways analogous to current practices. We have no clear idea on the limits of such activity. As we have indicated, we are not primarily seeking to fulfill a public service function related either to entertainment or pure information transmission. We do seek to fulfill the critical role of the university in demonstrating the limits of the possible.

August 10, 1983